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COMMENT
PATENTABILITY OF HUMAN GENETIC INFORMATION:
EXPLORING ETHICAL DILEMMAS WITHIN THE PATENT
OFFICE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY’S CLASH WITH THE
PUBLIC GOOD
ERIC D. ZARD1
INTRODUCTION
Increased advancements in biotechnology provide evidence for the remarkable capability of the human mind and have continually expanded
what the Supreme Court has referred to as the “unforeseeable nature” of
inventions.2 The discovery of the structure of DNA in 1953 drastically
transformed the study of biology.3 As scientists continue to make considerable advancements in understanding the fundamentals of DNA and that differences between human people stem from differences in DNA,4 new
ethical concerns in both U.S. and international patent law have also been
revealed. The Human Genome Project, which “was established to coordinate research aimed to identify all the genes in human DNA and to determine the order of the three billion chemical base pairs that make up human
DNA,” has not only resulted in the vast dissemination of knowledge to researchers and the general public, but has allowed for the identification of
particular sets of genes and their relationship to human health and disease.5
Genetic sequencing technology, stemming from the Human Genome Project, has resulted in an increase in the number of patent applications by
those attempting to secure exclusive rights over the newly discovered genetic information.
1. JD Candidate, 2009, University of St. Thomas School of Law; BS in Biology from the
University of Minnesota. Special thanks and acknowledgement to University of St. Thomas Professor Teresa S. Collett, who provided guidance and wisdom in the production of this article.
Additional acknowledgement to Dr. Janet E. Embretson, a registered patent attorney at
Schwegman, Lundberg and Woessner, who provided knowledgeable technical and substantive
edits and practical considerations in the production of this article.
2. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (landmark case determining that
bioengineered microorganisms can be patented).
3. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF PATENTING DNA 3 (2002), available
at http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/theethicsofpatentingdna.pdf [hereinafter NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS].
4. Id.
5. Id.
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Researchers and scientists worldwide quickly recognized that the discoveries and knowledge revealed through the Human Genome Project potentially carried vast commercial value if intellectual property rights could
be secured for this knowledge. About three thousand to five thousand patents on human genes and more than forty-seven thousand on inventions
involving genetic material have been granted by the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (USPTO).6 Advocates for allowing patent protection
on genetic information assert that it provides an incentive to innovate, a
means to recoup research and development (R&D) costs, and a guarantee
for protection within the market, and it facilitates the disclosure of scientific
knowledge.7 More recently, however, patents on genetic information, particularly human gene patents, have undergone increased scrutiny because of
the potential effects on health care costs, the flawed rationale for allowing
patents on genes, the ethical and moral concerns, and the questioning of
whether genetic information meets patentability requirements.8
This paper provides an overview of human genetic information and the
U.S. patent system. Part I provides a scientific analysis of the biological
structure of the patentable subject matter at issue and a brief introduction to
the Human Genome Project. Part II outlines the structure and purpose of the
United States patent system to provide an understanding of what a patentee
must currently undergo to be granted patent rights. Part III examines the
various legal aspects regarding the patentability of genetic material, specifically human genetic information. This section explores the constitutionality
of human gene patents and whether they meet utility and novelty requirements adopted by the USPTO. In addition, this section analyzes the ethical
and public policy implications of gene patents on research in healthcare and
diagnostic testing by making comparisons to the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) requirements and exploring case studies often referred to by
opponents of human gene patents. Moreover, it considers whether human
genetic information has an inherent “special nature” and, if so, whether it
should be taken into consideration by the USPTO. Finally, Part IV surveys
two proposals for patent reform that would give patent examiners relief
from the ethical dilemmas outlined in Part III. In total, this article aspires to
increase congressional awareness and survey the debate as to whether
United States patent regulation regarding human genetic information is in
need of reform.

6. Robert Cook-Deegan, Gene Patents, in BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK 69 (Mary Crowly ed.,
2008), available at http://www.thehastingscenter.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/Briefing_Book/
gene%20patents%20chapter.pdf.
7. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 3, at 6.
8. Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives with
Health Needs, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 65, 66 (2002) [hereinafter Andrews, The Gene
Patent Dilemma].
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PART I
DNA, Genes, Proteins and the Human Genome Project
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is essentially a collection of subunits,
composed of a sugar-phosphate molecule with a nitrogen-containing side
group (or base) attached to it, that string together to form two long
polymers.9 This subunit serves as the building block of DNA and is called a
nucleotide.10 The bases are of four types—adenine (A), guanine (G),
cytosine (C), and thymine (T)—corresponding to four distinct nucleotides.11 Each sugar is linked to the next via the phosphate group, creating a
polymer chain composed of a repetitive sugar-phosphate backbone with a
series of bases protruding from it.12 The bases protruding from the strand
bind to a complementary strand according to a strict rule defined by the
structures of the bases: A binds to T and C binds to G.13 The result of the
specific bonding rules is that each base pair forms one rung of the DNA
“ladder.”14 Because the bases protrude from the sugar-phosphate chains at
specific angles, the complementary pairing results in the two strands twisting around each other to form a double helix.15
The genetic instructions in DNA necessary to maintain a living organism act as the blueprint for life.16 Human life, and in fact all life, centers on
the cells’ “ability to store, retrieve and translate” this genetic information.17
DNA also stores hereditary information that is passed on during cell division to its daughter cells and from one generation to the next via that organism’s reproductive cells.18 Living cells store the genetic instructions as its
genes.19 Genes are “the information-containing elements that determine the
characteristics of a species as a whole and of the individuals within it.”20
Specifically, “genes are discrete segments of DNA molecules that contain
the information necessary for producing products which are most often proteins.”21 While DNA molecules are relatively large and contain genetic instructions for thousands of proteins, the molecule is composed of smaller
segments that code for specific proteins.22 Before the protein is produced,
9. BRUCE ALBERTS, ALEXANDER JOHNSON, JULIAN LEWIS, MARTIN RAFF, KEITH ROBERTS &
PETER WALTER, MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL, 5 figs.1–2 (4th ed. 2002).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 6.
14. Michele Westhoff, Gene Patents: Ethical Dilemmas and Possible Solutions, 20 HEALTH
L. 1, 3 (2008) (citing LORI B. ANDREWS ET AL., GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW, AND POLICY 17 (2002)).
15. Id.
16. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 9, at 191.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 3, at 4.
22. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 9, at 9.
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however, the segments must be transcribed into separate mRNA23 molecules.24 There are typically three regions of a gene that are relevant to genetic patents and the production of proteins: (1) “exons” that code for
proteins, (2) regions that mark the beginning and end of the gene, and (3)
“introns” that do not code for proteins.25 Before a protein can be constructed, the introns are removed from the gene by means of RNA splicing
so that the sequence can be properly decoded.26
The process of converting the coded sections of genes into proteins is
called gene expression and is performed in two stages.27 Gene transcription
is the first stage and involves a process whereby “the gene’s DNA sequence
is copied into RNA”28 and then processed into mRNA.29 Translation of the
genetic sequence occurs in the second stage and involves a “process by
which mRNA directs the synthesis of a protein.”30 Proteins produced during
gene expression “are composed of amino acids and are the molecules that
carry out the work of the cell.”31 Similar to DNA and RNA, protein molecules are “formed by the stringing together of monomeric building blocks
drawn from a standard repertoire that is the same for all living cells.”32 In
total, all of the genetic information embodied by the complete DNA sequence dictates not only the nature of the cell’s proteins, but also when and
where they are to be made.33 An organism’s complete DNA sequences
comprise its genome.34
Until the 1970s, DNA was the most difficult cellular molecule for the
biochemist to analyze.35 Due to advancements in both recombinant DNA
technology and techniques in DNA sequencing, it is now possible to isolate
and characterize a specific region of almost any genome, to produce a virtu23. mRNA (messenger RNA) guide the synthesis of proteins according to the genetic instructions stored in the DNA. RNA, unlike DNA, is single-stranded and has a flexible backbone allowing it to form weak bonds with another part of the same molecule. This enables it to recognize
other molecules by binding them selectively—and even to catalyze chemical changes in the molecules that are bound. Id. at 7.
24. Id. at 9.
25. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 3 (citing ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 14, at 22 and Mark A.
Chavez, Gene Patenting: Do the Ends Justify the Means? 7 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 255, 256
(2003)).
26. Id.
27. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 3, at 4 box 1.1.
28. RNA is closely related to DNA, but the backbone is formed of a slightly different sugar
(ribose instead of deoxyribose) and one of the four bases differs slightly (uracil in place of
thymine). ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 9, at 6.
29. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 3, at 4 box 1.1.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 9, at 7.
33. Id. at 10.
34. U.S. Dep’t of Energy Human Genome Project, About the Human Genome Project, available at http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/about.shtml (last visited
Mar. 16, 2009) [hereinafter HGP Information].
35. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 9, at 491.
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ally unlimited number of copies of it, and to determine the sequence of its
nucleotides in a few hours.36 In 1990, the Human Genome Project37 was
established with the following goals: (1) identify all of the approximately
20,000–25,000 genes in human DNA; (2) determine the sequences of the
three billion chemical base pairs that make up human DNA; (3) store this
information in a database; (4) improve tools for data analysis; (5) transfer
related technologies to the private sector; and (5) address the ethical, legal,
and social issues (ELSI) that may arise from the project.38 Since genes play
a role in many human diseases and disorders, identification was thought to
be the first step in the development of new diagnostic tests and treatments.39
With the techniques used during the Human Genome Project, “an isolated gene can be altered (engineered) at will and transferred back into the
germline of an animal or plant, so as to become a functional and heritable
part of the organism’s genome.”40 Technical breakthroughs “have provided
new tools for determining the functions of proteins and of individual domains within proteins, revealing a host of unexpected relationships between
them.”41 Notably, the new ways to efficiently mass produce protein hormones and vaccines made available large amounts of multiple different proteins, which ultimately resulted in the increased study of these complex
molecules.42 At this point, however, further study of genetic information
and the development of new treatments will depend on access, which could
be limited depending on the future developments in the area of gene
patenting.43
PART II
An Overview of U.S. Patent Law
The Constitution of the United States in Article I, § 8, cl. 8 states that
“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”44 The
USPTO, an agency of the United States Department of Commerce, carries
36. Id.
37. The U.S. Department of Energy and the National Institutes of Health coordinated the
Human Genome Project (HGP) and completed it in 2003. HGP Information, supra note 34.
38. Id. At the height of the HGP, large facilities with automated machines generated DNA
sequences at the rate of 1,000 nucleotides per second, around the clock. ALBERTS ET AL., supra
note 9, at 491.
39. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 3, at 3.
40. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 9, at 491.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. James Bradshaw, Gene Patent Policy: Does Issuing Gene Patents Accord with the Purposes of the U.S. Patent System? 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 637 (2001) (explaining the concern that
gene patents will block access to genetic information, which in turn will inhibit the development
of genetic technology and thereby adversely affect public health).
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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out this power. This language has been interpreted by the United States
Supreme Court to include:
(1) preserving public domain information through exclusion of
subject matter that is deemed unworthy of patent protection, (2)
providing incentive for private parties to invest in research, (3)
enlarging the public storehouse of knowledge by providing incentive for inventors to publicly disclose their inventions, and (4)
encouraging the commercial use of inventions.45
Patents in the United States are commonly viewed as “a contract between the people, as represented by the federal government, and an inventor.”46 That is, the inventor receives a time-limited exclusive right for the
invention,47 and in exchange, “[t]he inventor provides information to the
public which can be used by anyone to create improvements and new inventions.”48 Granting a temporary “monopoly” provides inventors with an
incentive to create and disclose new inventions.49 A patent provides its
owner the ability to prevent others from practicing the invention and thus
keeps the competition at bay.50 Inventors have an interest in being rewarded
for their effort, typically by being able to recoup financial investments in
research and development and profit from their inventions.51 Having this
exclusive right and security can be extremely valuable. For example, in the
pharmaceutical industry, a new drug can cost several hundred million dollars to develop and introduce to the market.52 The assurances of patent protection allow the inventor the opportunity to enjoy the “fruits of that
investment” and relieve concern that others may profit from his or her invention.53 Congress has determined that these temporary monopolies are
the most efficient means of “promoting the progress of science and the useful arts.”54
45. Bradshaw, supra note 43 (citing JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND ECOPRINCIPLES § 1.04 [4] (1999) (analyzing a series of U.S. Supreme Court patent cases and
distilling from them these enumerated principles)).
46. Carol A. Schneider et al., Patenting Life: A View from the Constitution and Beyond, 24
WHITTIER L. REV. 385, 387 (2002).
47. A “patent” is a property right which grants to the inventor the right to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or
importing the invention into the United States for a period of twenty years from the date on which
the application for the patent is filed. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, General Information Concerning Patents, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/index.html#patent (last visited
Mar. 15, 2009).
48. Schneider et al., supra note 46, at 387.
49. Id. at 388.
50. Id. (citing 1 PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1.03, 1–6 (2d ed.
1986)).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Schneider et al., supra note 46, at 387.
NOMIC
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For a patent application to become a patent, the application must meet
the statutory requirements of the Patent Act of 1952, which states: “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent thereof, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title.”55 Patentability depends on the inventors’ ability to meet several
conditions, including: utility, novelty, non-obviousness, written description,
and enablement.56 Particularly in examining a patent application involving
genetics, an “inventor must (1) identify novel genetic sequences, (2) specify
the sequence’s product, (3) specify how the product functions in nature (i.e.,
its use), and (4) enable one skilled in the field to use the sequence for its
stated purpose.”57
The USPTO is made up of several different examining groups58 with
jurisdiction over certain assigned fields of technology.59 The role of a patent examiner is to: (1) review patent applications to assess if they comply
with basic format and legal rules; (2) carry out a search of patents, patent
applications, and nonpatent documents, and the substantive examination of
the applications; (3) issue an action letter rejecting various claims and objecting to various informalities (the applicant is given a short time in which
to respond and, if desirable, amend the claim); and (4) review relevant prior
art that is disclosed by the inventor or their patent attorney.60 While the
USPTO does not have jurisdiction61 to enforce patent rights or over issues
of patent infringement, an appeal process for patent application does exist.62

55. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (2009).
56. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 4.
57. U.S. Dep’t of Energy Human Genome Project, Genetics and Patenting, http://
www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/patents.shtml (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).
58. In 2007, the USPTO was comprised of 8,913 federal employees, including 5,477 patent
examiners. The same year, 474,955 patent applications were received and 182,901 patent applications were granted. This massive influx of patent applications results in a latency period of nearly
32 months. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT,
FISCAL YEAR 2007 (2007), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2007/2007
annualreport.pdf; U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART CALENDAR YEARS 1963–2008, http://www.
uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).
59. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 3, at 78.
60. Id.
61. The U.S. Federal Courts have jurisdiction over issues involving patent claims such as
enforcement and infringement. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, General Information Concerning Patents, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/index.html (last visited Mar. 23,
2009).
62. The Board of Patent Appeals and Inferences is responsible for handling appeals for patents that have been rejected. Id.

\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-2\UST213.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 8

7-AUG-09

PATENTABILITY OF HUMAN GENETIC INFORMATION

16:17

493

PART III
Patentability of Human Genetic Information: Legal and Ethical Concerns
American jurisprudence is riddled with legal and ethical debates, and
patent law is no different. One ongoing debate, and the topic of this article,
gained momentum in 1980 when the U.S. Supreme Court held in Diamond
v. Chakrabarty that a live, human-made microorganism was patentable subject matter.63 Addressing the standard necessary to satisfy patentable subject matter requirements, the Court broadly determined it to include
“anything under the sun that is made by man.”64 The Court did carve out
exceptions to this rule, however, the two most notable being that mere ideas
and things that occur in nature are not patentable.65
Patentability of human genetic information falls under the more expansive debate over “gene patenting.”66 In the current state of U.S. patent law,
living matter (including subcellular matter such as DNA) is considered patentable, so long as it is altered from its natural form.67 The term “gene
patent” does not have any legal basis, but is typically one that seeks protection for “the sequence of a molecule of DNA that codes for a protein.”68
The USPTO definition of “gene patent,” however, includes a broader scope
and has resulted in patents for polynucleotides69 that correspond to “a fulllength protein encoding gene, a gene fragment, a regulatory region, a cDNA
molecule, or a genomic region of unknown function.”70 Under this definition, gene patents may also be granted for methods of diagnosing disease by
using particular genes or methods of using proteins for diagnostic testing.71
This broad definition raises legal and ethical concerns about the validity of
63. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). Chakrabarty filed a patent application
towards a genetically engineered bacterium which was capable of breaking down crude oil. The
bacteria were not naturally occurring and were thought to have a significant use for treating oil
spills.
64. Id. at 309.
65. Id. The Court noted that there are exceptions to this general rule: laws of nature, physical
phenomena and abstract ideas are not patentable.
66. Throughout this article, the term “human genetic information” and “gene patenting” may
be used interchangeably. However, it is important to note that the debate over “gene patenting”
typically includes patentability of animal and plant genetic information as well. Here, “human
genetic information” is used to refer to all aspects concerning the genetic information of humans,
including: DNA, RNA, proteins, cDNA, mRNA, etc.
67. Schneider et al., supra note 46, at 391.
68. Id.
69. Polynucleotides are a polymetric chain of nucleotides, essentially DNA or RNA sequences. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 901 (10th ed. 2001).
70. Gregory C. Ellis, Emerging Biotechnologies Demand Defeat of Proposed Legislation that
Attempts to Ban Gene Patents, 15 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2008); see Christopher M. Holman,
The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and Access: A Survey of Human Gene Patent
Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295, 312 (2007) (providing examples of issued patents that claim a
variety of different forms of genetic compositions); see also Ellis, Parts II.B-C (discussing the
patentability of genetic compositions).
71. Bradshaw, supra note 43.
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these patents and the potential effects on both public benefit and social welfare. The legal debate largely focuses on whether human gene patents are
patentable subject matter and whether the intent of the framers to “promote
the progress of science” is satisfied.72 Coupled with the legal debate, some
commentators argue that ethical and moral issues must be considered in
developing strong public policy and weighed when determining whether
U.S. patent law should grant human gene patents.73 A discussion of the
balance between the potential deleterious consequences to healthcare, the
restraints on commercial and academic research, and the special nature of
DNA must be included in this debate.
A. Legal Foundation of Patents on Human Genetic Information
The USPTO has been granting patent protection to gene sequences for
a number of years.74 More recently, however, the legitimacy of these patents has been questioned on the grounds of constitutionality and subject
matter requirements. The most controversial areas of this legal debate revolve around whether patents on human genetic information are unconstitutional and whether they meet the novelty and utility requirements of the
Patent Act of 1952.75
1. Are Patents on Human Genetic Information Unconstitutional?
The Supreme Court explained that the purpose for granting patents is
to provide incentives for inventiveness and research efforts.76 It was the
Framers’ understanding that if inventors were granted temporary exclusive
rights to their invention, they would be properly incentivized by the possibility to not only recover research and development costs but also to have a
prospect at receiving a profit from their labor.77 Proponents argue that “patents facilitate genetic research by encouraging investment in what would
otherwise be a risky financial investment.”78 Further, due to the intellectual
and financial investments and the ever expanding timeline associated with
potentially returning a profit, biotechnology industry insiders insist that patents continue to be made available for genetic material.79 According to in72. See generally Schneider et al., supra note 46.
73. See generally NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 3; Westhoff, supra note 14.
74. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 13.
75. Ellis, supra note 70, at 6.
76. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974) (further explaining that
“[t]he productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by
way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens.”).
77. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 6 (citing Schneider et al., supra note 46, at 387–88).
78. Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 653.
79. Id.; see Oversight Hearing on Gene Patents and Other Genomic Inventions Before the
House Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, Comm. of the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 74
(2000) (statement of Dennis J. Henner, PhD, Senior Vice President, Research, Genentech, Inc.).

\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-2\UST213.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 10

7-AUG-09

PATENTABILITY OF HUMAN GENETIC INFORMATION

16:17

495

siders, this is especially true for “small biotechnology companies because
most of these companies have no revenue from sales to fund research,”80
but instead “they depend on venture capital and public market investors.”81
Therefore, advocates argue that if patents on genetic information are barred,
companies without other sources of revenue to fund research will lose their
ability to attract investors, ultimately resulting in significant delay in the
research process, or worse, the research never being performed.82 Advocates reason that by allowing human gene patents, Congress satisfies its role
of promoting “the progress of science” since it effectively removes the fear
that invaluable genetic research will cease.83
Conversely, those challenging the constitutionality of these patents argue that Congress is not promoting the progress of science because gene
patents prohibit genetic research, introduce barriers to developing treatments and cures for genetic disease, and can potentially delay public availability of scientific information.84 In addition, opponents challenge the
validity of the position that without innovation, genetic research will
cease.85 Commentators have stated that “researchers desiring to study a
complete gene may have to obtain expensive licenses from several patent
holders who have rights to different fragments of that gene.”86 Moreover,
commentators propose that “if a researcher wanted to study a genetic disease in hopes of developing a treatment or cure, he or she could potentially
have to obtain licenses from every scientist who has patented the disease
gene or a mutation of that gene.”87 As an example, critics frequently rely on
two patented genes in particular, BRCA1 and BRCA88—two identified

80. Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development estimated that the fully capitalized cost
to develop a new drug, including studies constructed after receiving regulatory approval, averages
$897 million. Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, Total Cost to Develop a New
Prescription Drug, Including Cost of Post-Approval Research, is $897 Million, May 13, 2003,
http://csdd.tufts.edu/NewsEvents/RecentNews.asp?newsid=29 (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 7 (citing Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 653).
84. Id. at 6–7.
85. Id. at 7.
86. Id. (citing Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 699 (1998)). The Heller article discusses
what has been colloquially referred to as the “Tragedy of the Anticommons Theory.” It is essentially a play on the Garrett Hardin article “The Tragedy of the Commons,” suggesting that people
underuse scarce resources because too many owners block each other due to recent proliferation
of intellectual property rights in biomedical and biotechnology research. Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
87. Id.
88. Myriad Genetics secured patents on BRCA1 and BRCA2, the mutations, and screening
tests. Mutations in BRCA1 and BRCA2 account for an estimated 5–10% of breast cancer cases
and a significantly elevated risk for ovarian cancer. Cook-Deegan, supra note 6.
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genes which affect the risk of breast and ovarian cancer in women89—stating that:
[i]n order to compile viable, useful data, an investigator studying
this disease would not only have to obtain licenses from each of
the two inventors holding patent rights to these genes, but would
also have to negotiate with the hundreds of other scientists who
have discovered and patented mutations of these genes.90
The real concern expressed by these commentators is that “anyone who
owns a patent to a gene or a mutation can refuse another scientist a license
or charge exorbitant prices for the license and stymie research efforts.”91
Based on this position, critics conclude that gene patents result in an improper deviation from Congress’s role “to promote the progress of science”
and, therefore, that gene patents are unconstitutional.92
Critics have also challenged proponents who claim that invaluable genetic research will cease if incentives are removed by highlighting the differences between pharmaceutical research and genetic research, relying on
language in Chakrabarty.93 Commentators have argued that the isolation
and purification of genetic material does not require the same motivation as
pharmaceutical drug development—pointing out that “[m]olecular biologists were attempting to identify genes long before the [USPTO] made clear
that genes could be patented.”94 Further, some argue that unlike the FDA
clinical service approval process for pharmaceutical drugs, which is a
highly regulated process that typically presents another financial burden on
the inventor, the need to financially compensate an inventor researching an
application for a particular isolated gene is not as great because the FDA
does not have the same requirements for genetic clinical testing.95 These
commentators rely on Chief Justice Burger’s analysis in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, where he notably stated that “legislative or judicial fiat as to
patentability will not deter the scientific mind from probing into the un89. Lori B. Andrews, Gene Patents: The Need for Bioethics Scrutiny and Legal Change, 5
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 403, 403 (2004) [hereinafter Andrews, Gene Patents].
90. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 7 (citing Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 8,
at 84–85).
91. Id. (citing Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 86, at 699). It is important to note that a
common law defense to infringement exists and has become known as the “Experimental Use
Doctrine.” While courts have narrowly construed this exception, it serves as a valid defense if the
patent was used (1) for a legitimate business reason, and (2) solely for amusement, or (3) to satisfy
idle curiosity, or (4) for strictly philosophical inquiry. See generally Madey v. Duke Univ., 307
F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
92. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 5.
93. See id. at 7; see also Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 8, at 77–79.
94. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 8, at 77.
95. Id. (citing LORI ANDREWS, FUTURE PERFECT: CONFRONTING DECISIONS ABOUT GENETICS
126 (2001) (noting that the FDA must review labeling materials on genetic testing kits as part of
the premarket approval and because most genetic tests are marketed as services, not kits, they are
not subject to FDA premarket approval)).
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known any more than Canute could command the tides.”96 Since “there are
fewer social, economic, and public health costs [associated with] granting a
drug patent than a gene patent”97 and because language in U.S. patent law
precedent supports the notion that research will continue without incentive,
critics reason that removing patent protection will not result in cessation of
invaluable genetic research. As a result, critics have urged courts to recognize that the federal government’s attempt to “promote the progress of science” by granting patents for human genetic information is fruitless, and
therefore, these patents should be deemed unconstitutional.
Proponents of human gene patents have largely relied on well-established Supreme Court precedent to validate their argument that gene patents
are constitutional. These commentators have rebutted the criticism that gene
patents interfere with research by challenging the study used to formulate
its conclusion.98 The particular survey in question reported that twenty-one
percent of geneticists’ reasons for withholding post publication information,
data, or materials were based on the “need to protect the commercial value
of the results.”99 Proponents argue that the survey was “silent as to whether
the researchers who were actually prevented from obtaining information or
materials because of commercial interests were themselves basic researchers with no commercial ambitions.”100 Accordingly, they assert that the
“true test [is] whether . . . biomedical researchers without commercial interests are prevented from acquiring materials, not whether researchers with
commercial interest are withholding materials.”101 Relying on a more recent
survey,102 the evaluators conclude that the results “offer little empirical basis for claims that restricted access to [intellectual property] is currently
impeding biomedical research.”103 With this evidence, proponents conclude
that there is insufficient evidence to confirm that gene patents specifically
interfere with strictly academic research,104 and therefore no conclusive evidence exists to suggest that gene patents impede on Congress’s attempts to
“promote the progress of science.”105
96. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980).
97. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 8, at 77.
98. Ellis, supra note 70, at 26. See generally Eric G. Campbell et al., Data Withholding in
Academic Genetics: Evidence from a National Survey, 287 JAMA 473 (2002) (national survey to
determine the nature, extent, and consequences of data withholding in academic genetics).
99. Campbell et al., supra note 98, at 478.
100. Ellis, supra note 70, at 14 (asserting that this omission is critical to concluding that such
data signifies a hindrance on noncommercial biomedical research).
101. Id. at 27.
102. Id. (citing John P. Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers,
309 SCI. 2002, 2002 (2005)).
103. Id. (quoting Walsh et al., supra note 102, at 2002). Please note the “Experimental Use
Doctrine” outlined at note 91.
104. Ellis, supra note 70, at 27 (citing Walsh et al., supra note 102, at 2003).
105. Id.
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Regardless of the debate over survey credibility and which evidence
should be given the most weight in determining whether gene patents detract from or contribute to the Congressional power of “promot[ing] the
progress of science,” it is of central importance that the USPTO has continued to issue patents for genetic information and that U.S. patent law precedent has yet to declare these patents unconstitutional.
2. Do Patents on Human Genetic Information Meet Utility
Requirements?
Section 101 of the Patent Act requires that, for an invention to be patentable, it must be “useful.”106 In the majority of patent applications, establishing the utility standard is relatively easy compared to the other
requirements.107 When it comes to gene patents however, defining the standard to meet this requirement can be more difficult.108 The difficulty in
establishing this standard arises because “the useful properties of a gene
(such as its ability to bind to another complementary strand of DNA for
diagnosis or its ability to code for a particular protein) are not ones that the
scientists [have] invented, but rather are natural, inherent properties of
genes themselves.”109
Biotechnological breakthroughs surrounding “the advent of automated
high-through put sequencing techniques” and the Human Genome Project
in 1990 resulted in scientists “generat[ing] large quantities of raw genomic
data.”110 While the information contained in this newly revealed genetic
information was largely unknown, competition between the private and
public sectors developed as organizations began to seek patent protection
for what they deemed commercially valuable information.111 In turn, controversy surrounding the “utility” standard emerged when Dr. J. Craig Venter112 applied for 6,800 expressed sequence tags113 and subsequently “sent
106. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 4. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2008).
107. Mark A. Chavez, Gene Patenting: Do the Ends Justify the Means?, 7 COMP. L. REV. &
TECH. J. 255, 259 (2003), available at http://smu.edu/stlr/articles/2003/Spring/Chavez.pdf.
108. Id. (stating that “[in] cases where biotechnological material at issue cures disease or is
used as a pharmaceutical product, it is easy to satisfy the utility standard” compared to applicants
for biotechnological patents).
109. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 8, at 71 (arguing that when a gene is
discovered and knowledge about the sequence of the gene is used to identify whether a particular
patient has a mutation in that gene, there are no expensive clinical trials necessary).
110. Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 642 (citing Martin Enserink, Patent Office May Raise the
Bar in Gene Claims, 287 SCI. 1196, 1196–97 (2000)).
111. Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 642 (stating that “[b]ecause genetic research is a cumulative
endeavor, the work of downstream researchers depends on access to upstream discoveries. The
owners of upstream discoveries can put a price on such access, transforming raw scientific data
into a valuable commodity.”).
112. J. Craig Venter was the founder of commercially-based Celera Genomics that competed
with the federally funded Human Genome Project to complete the sequencing of the human genome. Ellis, supra note 70, at 17 n.51 (citing Jonathan Kahn, What’s the Use? Law and Authority in
Patenting Human Genetic Material, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV 417, 420 (2003)).
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20,000 genes sequences to the [USPTO], [applying for] patents to the sequences and to procedures that would be used to diagnose disorders [associated] with [the] genes.”114 Faced with negative response from the scientific
community and protest by the general public, the USPTO enacted new utility guidelines known as the 2001 Utility Examination Guidelines (Guidelines).115 Importantly, the Guidelines created the “specific, substantial, and
credible” test for utility, which has been applied as a stricter standard for
establishing usefulness of a gene patent.116 To determine whether a particular patent meets these factors, patent examiners may consult a training manual issued by the USPTO.117 First, the manual states that “a utility is
‘specific’ when it is particular to the subject matter claimed.”118 Second, the
“substantial utility” requirement is determined by an examination of the
patent’s “real world” use.119 This means that “if no further experimentation
is required to show an immediate benefit of the genetic sequence for which
a patent is desired,” then this typically was satisfactory.120 Finally, “a utility
is ‘credible’ if a person skilled in the art would accept that the invention is
immediately available for the [disclosed] use.”121
Prior to the adoption of the Guidelines, attempts to bar the patentability of genetic information altogether or attempts to statutorily limit the
breadth of a particular gene patent by arguing that the patent failed to meet
the utility standard were the most convincing.122 However, because more
information is required in order to receive a patent for genetic information,
this criticism has become moot.123 Nevertheless, gene patent critics remain
concerned that “the revised [G]uidelines will not stop abuse” of what they
113. Ellis, supra note 70, at 17. Expressed sequence tags are small pieces of DNA sequence
(usually two-hundred to five-hundred nucleotides long) that are generated by sequencing either
one or both ends of an expressed gene. National Center for Biotechnology Information, Just the
Facts: A Basic Introduction to the Science Underlying NCBI Resources, http://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/About/primer/est.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2009).
114. See iBrief, The Fate of Gene Patents Under the New Utility Guidelines, 2001 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 8, ¶ 5 (2001) (Venter’s applications were denied by the USPTO. The USPTO went on
to require that an inventor show a level of utility beyond the gene’s use as a research tool.)
[hereinafter iBrief, The Fate of Gene Patents].
115. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 4 (citing iBrief, The Fate of Gene Patents, supra note 114).
116. iBrief, The Fate of Gene Patents, supra note 114, ¶¶ 11–14.
117. Id.
118. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 5 (quoting iBrief, The Fate of Gene Patents, supra note 114).
119. iBrief, The Fate of Gene Patents, supra note 114, ¶ 13. This portion of the test is “designed to prevent the granting of patents if further research must be performed before the genetic
material can be used for a specific purpose or benefit.”
120. Id.
121. Id. Before the 2001 guidelines went into effect, researchers were often granted patents
simply by claiming that the ESTs were useful as general genetic research tools. Under the new
guidelines, however, an EST is not specifically useful unless the patent application also identifies
the complete gene with which the EST is associated.
122. Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 649–50 (citing Stephen G. Kunin, Written Description
Guidelines and Utility Guidelines, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 77, 93 (2000)).
123. Id.

\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-2\UST213.txt

500

unknown

Seq: 15

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

7-AUG-09

16:17

[Vol. 6:2

believe to be “relatively lax utility requirements.”124 These same critics
point to multiple factors that portray the heightened utility requirement as
“an obstacle, rather than a substantial bar, to patentability.”125 Critics argue
that regardless of whether patent agents are given training manuals and
more objective standards, the utility requirements are “inherently difficult
to define and will always remain the subject of uncertainty.”126 The resulting uncertainty, according to critics, is counterproductive and may potentially establish an additional burden for less financially endowed
inventors.127 That is, because the burden is on the applicant to establish
patentability and because patent examiners have limited financial resources,
critics recognize that uncertainty increases the ability of applicants to cleverly navigate past a potential utility rejection.128 Second, critics are concerned that the Guidelines will conflict with judicial precedent, resulting in
the federal courts declaring the utility requirements invalid.129 Third, some
commentators suggest that the new standards may be counterproductive because they could cause scientists to focus their research toward developing
products or isolating genes that are certain to meet the Guidelines.130 Their
concern is that the scientific community, as a whole, would be harmed because potentially beneficial research would be discouraged since the products of that research would be ineligible for patent protection and therefore
be regarded as having insignificant value.131
In general, commentators who doubt the effectiveness of heightened
utility standards in curtailing gene patents ground their discontent on the
fear that biotech companies will take advantage of “opportunistic protection
of subsequently discovered uses.”132 For example, Human Genome Sciences (HGS), a company based in Maryland, obtained a patent after filing a
relatively generic application regarding the utility of a gene known as
HDGNR10.133 At the time that HGS filed the application, HGS was unaware that the protein encoded by the gene was a receptor essential for HIV

124. Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 651 (citing Enserink, supra note 110, at 1197) (claiming that
“thousands of patent applications have been filed on genes . . . without a single experiment” and
were filed solely on characterization through “computer searches”).
125. Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 652.
126. Id.
127. Id. (arguing that practitioners drafting patent applications for genetic information are obligated to exploit the uncertainty to the advantage of their client and that one skillful in drafting
applications would have little trouble overcoming the standard for a client with seemingly unlimited resources).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 652.
132. Ellis, supra note 70, at 10.
133. Id.
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infection.134 Within the same year, scientists at the National Institutes of
Health had identified and named the receptor.135 Although HGS was oblivious to the significance of the protein encoded by HDGNR10, HGS maintains an “exclusive right to license the patent to another biotechnology that
is using the CCR5 protein product in an effort to develop an HIV
vaccine.”136
While it is reasonable for critics to express discomfort over extreme
circumstances such as those outlined above, advocates for gene patents contend that the Guidelines have “corroborated the USPTO’s intent to issue
patents [for] genetic composition under requisite circumstances.”137 Further, advocates tout that the Guidelines give patent examiners direction in
determining “real world” utility and reduce the possibility for opportunistic
patenting.138 Finally, in response to the concern that the federal courts may
declare the Guidelines invalid, proponents notably rely on In re Fisher,
which indoctrinated the Guidelines into common law.139
In regard to this aspect of the debate, both positions maintain valid
reasoning as to whether genetic patents meet the proper utility standard.
However, by adopting Guidelines to create a more definitive utility standard
and providing training manuals for patent examiners to ensure objective
review processes, the USPTO has indicated its intent to grant patents to a
more limited group of inventions and, therefore, critics’ arguments have
become less persuasive.140 Absent significant evidence to conclude that the
Guidelines create an unfair legal prejudice, it is unlikely that successful
gene patents will be revoked on the theory that they fail to meet the subject
matter requirement of utility.
3. Do Patents on Human Genetic Information Meet the Novelty
Requirement?
As a bedrock principle, to obtain a patent, an inventor must create
something new.141 According to section 102 of the Patent Act, an invention
is novel unless it is known or used, has already been patented, or is described in a printed publication within the United States or a foreign coun134. Id.; see Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 651 (citing Enserink, supra note 110, at 1197) (noting that the human gene patented by HGS was found using publicly owned sequence information
generated by the Human Genome Project).
135. Ellis, supra note 70, at 10. The name of the protein is CCR5.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 11.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 12 (citing In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (rejecting a patent application for ETSs corresponding to certain maize genes because the inventor was unaware of the
precise structure or function of the genes encoded by the ETSs when the patent application was
filed)).
140. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 8.
141. ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 357 (2007).
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try.142 The question of whether patent applications for genetic discoveries
meet the novelty requirement under section 102 is often “further complicated by the fact that it overlaps in many respects with the question of
whether genes are patentable subject matter.”143 Similar to utility requirements, advocates and critics differ in their beliefs about whether gene patents satisfy the novelty requirement of section 102.
Critics of patenting human genetic information argue that this information cannot meet the novelty requirement because the product’s own qualities allow it to be produced naturally within the human body and therefore
statutory bars should be established to remove the possibility of patent protection and ownership.144 Similarly, critics argue that because of the Human
Genome Project and other similar projects performed in laboratories to
identify and isolate genetic information, the patent applications should be
denied since they would be trying to establish an exclusive right to “prior
art.”145 Further, some critics contend that “genes should be statutorily excluded from patentability because they are mere discoveries, not inventions.”146 Genes in their natural form are typically determined to be
ineligible for patent protection unless certain processes are performed to
meet the novelty requirements.147 For example, if a scientist wishes to create a usable template for a particular genetic sequence so that it has a higher
probability of satisfying the novelty requirement, he or she may choose to
remove the introns and leave only the exons to be reassembled, thus creating a cDNA molecule that performs the same function as the original.148
The concern is that this isolated and purified gene has “the same function as
a naturally-occurring gene” and the patent holder’s application is actually
an attempt to claim ownership of the original genetic sequence as it is found
in the human body.149 Instead, critics have proposed “that because the
human genome is literally the blueprint of humankind’s common heritage,
it is a perfect candidate for an international treaty that ‘would vest all right
in the human genome in humanity as a whole and provide that all of humanity should benefit from its exploration . . . .’”150
142. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2002).
143. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 5 (citing Chavez, supra note 107, at 259).
144. Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 646.
145. Id. at 647 (additionally stating that “[t]his argument contemplates denying patent protection to substances that were subject to prior cultural knowledge or use . . . such as genetically
engineered pharmaceuticals that were derived from healing herbs used by pre-industrialized
societies.”).
146. Id. at 647–48.
147. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 5.
148. Id. (citing Chavez, supra note 107, at 259) (notably stating that, “the USPTO holds that
laboratory-created cDNA molecules meet the statutory requirements for novelty”). cDNA, or
complementary DNA, is a molecule that contains only the uninterrupted coding sequences of a
gene. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 9, at 503–04.
149. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 8; see also Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 647–48.
150. Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 647; see also David Keays, Patenting DNA and Amino Acid
Sequences—An Australian Perspective, 7 HEALTH L.J. 69, 72–76 (1999)). While some commenta-
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Alternatively, those supporting human gene patents contend that the
debate as to whether products of nature should be patented has been settled
by nearly a century of legislative history and judicial precedent. Proponents
challenge the critics’ argument by relying on the broad language used by
the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty where it stated that “Congress intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun
that is made by man.’”151 Moreover, advocates argue that based on the
decision in In re Bergstrom,152 “isolated and purified compositions are not
excluded from patentability.”153 Finally, proponents rely on the Guidelines,
which they concede will not allow for gene patents simply for “sequence
data that represent genes as they naturally occur with human chromosomes.”154 Thus, proponents argue that the proper assurances are in place to
guarantee that a gene patent will only be granted if it is useful as a “pharmaceutical drug, screening assay, or other application.”155
In sum, the USPTO continues to grant patents for human genetic information without being challenged on legal grounds by the court or legislature. In the legal debate as to whether human genetic information should be
statutorily excluded from patent protection, critics seeking change through
the courts appear to have an uphill battle due to the strong U.S. patent law
precedent and application Guidelines that have been directed against frivolous gene patent applications. However, the critics have not gone unnoticed.
The USPTO has evidenced its willingness to make appropriate changes to
the application process by promulgating the Guidelines.156 Similarly, legislative activity (although recently rejected) proves that the public at large is
becoming aware that patent reform may be necessary.157
B. Ethical Issues and Public Policy Surrounding the Patentability of
Human Genetic Information
As previously discussed, patent law precedent and legislative history
provide that genetic information is patentable subject matter and that gene
tors have characterized this concept, known as the “Common Heritage Principle,” as a policy
rather than a legal argument, it is an international legal concept that conveys equal property interests to all people.
151. Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 647–48 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303,
309–10 (1980)).
152. In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding that hormones isolated
and purified from human prostate glands were held to exist in a state not found in nature); see also
Parke Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y 1911), aff’d, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir.
1912) (determining that extracted adrenaline was patentable).
153. Ellis, supra note 70, at 8.
154. Id. at 9 (citing Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 648–49).
155. Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 648–49.
156. Notice, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001).
157. The Genomic Research Accessibility Act was introduced to prohibit the patenting of
human genetic material. This bill was rejected. See generally Genomic Research and Accessibility
Act, H.R. 977, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (1st Sess. 2007).
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patents are capable of withstanding challenges on constitutional grounds.158
Unlike the legal debate, where proponents of gene patents can more easily
revert to supporting statutory and judicial language, the ethical debate involves a robust discussion between balancing innovation and incentive with
the protection of the “public good”159 and the “common heritage of humanity.”160 While commentators have suggested that U.S. patent law is “morally neutral,”161 it is difficult for proponents to deny the existence of ethical
and moral principles surrounding patents on genetic information. Critics of
gene patents view these principles as the fundamental building blocks for
establishing a strong public policy argument, which they believe in turn,
may influence patent reform.
Although it would be naive to represent that ethical and moral considerations exist in isolation from other interests concerning gene patents, it is
difficult to address the interplay between these issues on a broad scale. For
that reason, this section attempts to logically separate the debate into the
two main policy considerations, as represented by commentators advocating
for and against genetic patents.
1. Healthcare Concerns Surrounding Patents on Human Genetic
Information
The debate surrounding potential deleterious consequences to healthcare is fervently contested and multifaceted. Accordingly, this section will
first discuss whether genetic patents discourage research that could potentially promote healthcare. Second, this section will examine the debate on
the impact that human gene patents have on access to genetic diagnostic
tests. Throughout this particular debate, critics and proponents make utilitarian objections and debate the proper means to incentivizing innovation
while preserving both quality and access to healthcare.
Those opposing gene patents argue that because these patents inhibit
research that can contribute to healthcare, it is unethical and against public
policy to allow patents on human genetic information.162 As noted previously, the patent law grants exclusive rights for twenty years from filing.163
158. Ellis, supra note 70, at 12.
159. “Public Good” is a phrase commonly referred to in economics. Generally, it refers to a
“good” that if consumed by one individual, does not reduce availability of the good for consumption by others, and similarly, no one can be excluded from using the good. As an example, a
fireworks display funded by an entrepreneur can be observed by people from their backyards or
windows and the entrepreneur cannot charge a fee for consumption. See generally Tyler Cowen,
Public Goods, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2d ed.), http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicGoods.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2008).
160. Common Heritage of Mankind, ENCYCLOPæDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/930727/common-heritage-of-mankind (last visited Dec. 3, 2008).
161. Bradshaw, supra note 43, at 649 (citing SCHLICHER, supra note 45, § 1.04).
162. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 8 (citing Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 86).
163. See supra text accompanying note 47.
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During that twenty year period, patent holders are not required to actually
use or develop the invention,164 which means that they can prevent others
from profiting from their invention even though they are not profiting from
the invention themselves.165 More commonly, however, patent holders take
advantage of their patent and either exclusively use the patented invention
or license the patented invention to others.166 Commentators fear that gene
patents will limit clinical testing, restrict innovation, and inhibit the discovery of potentially higher-quality and lower-cost methods.167
Likewise, there is concern that a “patent holder might forbid anyone
from using the genetic sequence it has patented, even if the patent holder
does not itself offer a diagnostic test using that sequence.”168 In genetic
research, this issue arises when inventors working in different laboratories
receive exclusive rights to “various fragments of a single gene” and either
refuse to license their patent or make it difficult for a researcher to study a
particular genetic disorder because they cannot track down who owns the
patent rights.169 High transactional costs and the fear of infringing another’s
patent rights may deter scientists all together, thus “depriving humanity of
potential treatments and cures for diseases.”170 With the increasing research
surrounding pharmacogenomics and in the current state of economy, it becomes more probable that transactional costs will rise or that patent holders
wanting to achieve financial security will more actively enforce their exclusive patent rights, ultimately impeding the progression of healthcare and
breaching public policy.171
Additionally, critics have cited multiple surveys which they believe
evidence the effect that gene patents have had in inhibiting research toward
promoting healthcare.172 The findings of these surveys concluded that: (1)
“[a]cademic researchers with funds from companies are four times as likely
as those without such funds to report that trade secrets have resulted from
their research;”173 (2)“[o]ne of every five medical scientists has delayed
publication of research results for at least half a year in order to protect
financial interests;”174 (3) “scientists who were directly engaged in the com164. Andrews, Gene Patents, supra note 89, at 409. This is different than under European
patent law, where if the patent holder fails to use the invention, he or she loses the exclusive right.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 407 (citing Yee Wah Chin, Unilateral Technology Suppression: Appropriate Antitrust and Patent Law Remedies, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 441, 450 (1998)).
167. Jon F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test, 415 NATURE 577, 579 (2002).
168. Andrews, Gene Patents, supra note 89, at 408–09.
169. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 8 (citing Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 86, at 699).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 8, at 80.
173. Id. (summarizing results from David Blumenthal et al., University-Industry Research Relationships in Biotechnology: Implications for the University, 232 SCI. 1361, 1362 (1986)).
174. Id. (summarizing results from David Blumenthal et al., Withholding Research Results in
Academic Life Sciences, 277 JAMA 1224, 1224 (1997)).
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mercialization of their research were three times more likely to delay publication and twice as likely to refuse to share information than those who
were doing basic work;”175 (4) “[a]mong the life scientists, geneticists were
the most likely to withhold data;”176 (5) “[47%] of geneticists surveyed had
been denied requests from other faculty members for information, data, or
materials regarding published research;”177 (6) “more than [20%] of geneticists surveyed said that they intentionally withheld data to protect the commercial value of their results;”178 and (7) “[28%] of geneticists surveyed
reported that they were unable to duplicate published research because other
academic scientists refused to share information, data, or materials.”179
These studies confirm the argument that patents on genetic information delay researchers in both academia and commercial institutions, and thus, significantly obstruct research in healthcare. Critics argue that delay resulting
from an “uncooperative academic community” may deter scientists from
performing the research altogether.180 For example, commentators often
highlight a case where the study of a particular gene associated with autism
was obstructed when researchers withheld a patient’s tissue sample so as to
be the first to discover the gene and reap the financial benefits.181
Delay in the patent application process,182 however, can also have significant consequences. These delays have given some applicants an opportunity to exploit other researchers by using what is commonly referred to as
a “submarine patent” strategy.183 In the context of genetic research, the
problem typically arises while a patent is making its way through the application process and a second, independent researcher, discovers the same
genetic sequence and begins to develop a diagnostic screening test based on
that sequence.184 Unbeknownst to the second researcher, “when the original
patent application is granted” the first researcher can exclude “the second
175. Id. (summarizing results from Blumenthal et al., supra note 173, at 1226–27).
176. Id. (summarizing results from Blumenthal et al., supra note 173, at 1227–28).
177. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 8, at 80 (summarizing results from
David Blumenthal et al., Data Withholding in Academic Genetics, 473 JAMA 473, 477 (2002)).
178. Id. (summarizing results from David Blumenthal et al., supra note 177, at 478).
179. Id. at 81 (noting that this particular statistic is particularly troubling since the scientific
community typically holds peer review in the highest regard).
180. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 8 (citing Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 86, at 699).
181. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 8, at 80 (citing Eliot Marshall, Whose
DNA Is It Anyway?, 278 SCI. 564, 564 (1997)).
182. Patent applications often take more than 32 months. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, supra note 61.
183. This “tactic” results when a broad “submarine patent” is filed and continuous amendments are made to the file to hold the patent in the patent office until “an individual later tries to
use the idea contained in the patent,” at which point, “the inventor will demand royalties or
threaten to file a lawsuit.” Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 8, at 86 (citing Steven
Blount, The Use of Delaying Tactics to Obtain Submarine Patents and Amend Around a Patent
that a Competitor Has Designed Around, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 11, 13 (1999)).
184. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 8, at 86.
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researcher from making its test or treatment available.”185 If the second
researcher still desires to make use of his or her research, the owner may
demand an exorbitant licensing fee.186 As previously cited, this problem
was realized in 2000 when HGS received a patent for the HDGNR10 receptor.187 Only after being later discovered by researchers at the National Institutes of Health, did HGS comprehend that the patent was for the CCR5
receptor, a critical receptor in AIDS research.188 Thereafter, HGS was able
to exclude National Institutes of Health from all “research on CCR5 function and use in development of an HIV treatment.”189 Accordingly, critics
have argued that such egregious outcomes create disincentives for further
research and will eventually distract researchers from making discoveries
that would benefit public health.190
In contrast, proponents for gene patents contend that such patents actually encourage innovation within healthcare.191 Similar to the rebuttal on
the constitutionality of gene patents, proponents largely challenge critics’
utilitarian objections rather than the moral objections.192 Specifically, proponents dispute the survey results used to formulate the critics’ argument.193 By querying whether these surveys have addressed the proper
policy question, drawing on more recent statistical evidence, and reviewing
the legislative history of human gene patents, proponents claim that human
gene patents favor research that promotes healthcare.194
Proponents first argue that the statistics relied on by critics are largely
based on anecdotal evidence gathered from a single third-party survey
which sought to determine the full range of genetic data withheld by academic geneticists.195 Although the rising interest in patent metrics has resulted in new empirical work, legal scholars and economists alike have long
recognized the difficultly in interpreting data on patents.196 Further, proponents argue that the survey fails to address “whether the researchers who
were actually prevented from obtaining information or materials because of
commercial interests were themselves basic researchers with no commercial
185. Id. (citing Blount, supra note 183, at 13).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 87 (citing Pat Carson & Melissa Mandrgoc, Gene-Based Drugs Challenge Patent
Process, 226 N.Y.L.J. 73, 73 (2001)); see also Arthur Allen, Who Owns My Disease?, MOTHER
JONES, Nov. 1, 2001, at 52).
188. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 8, at 86.
189. Id. at 88.
190. Id.
191. Ellis, supra note 70, at 13.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 13–14.
194. Id.; see also David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677 (2007); Holman, supra
note 70.
195. Ellis, supra note 70, at 13–14 (arguing that the survey relied on was not unique to gene
patents, but rather it concerned all “life scientists”).
196. Adleman & DeAngelis, supra note 194, at 1707.
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ambitions.”197 Proponents contend that this omission is critical to the debate
and assert that a conclusion as to whether gene patents hinder biomedical
research cannot be made without it.198 Instead, they proposed a slightly different test that they believed would more accurately address the critics’ policy concerns.199 The test inquires “whether biomedical researchers without
commercial interests are prevented from acquiring materials.”200 Proponents suggest that if a researcher is pursuing a non-commercial interest and
is not dissuaded from acquiring material or performing research that promotes healthcare, then there has been no breach of public policy.201 Since
the critics’ proposed evidence is unsupportive, proponents continue their
argument by relying on more recent surveys of biomedical researchers in
universities, government, and nonprofit institutions.202 These surveys questioned whether patents could be blamed for blocking access to biomedical
research materials and reported that “while access to research materials at
times may be strict, ‘the patent status of requested materials had no significant effect’ on why those materials were restricted.”203 The study looked at
“[a] huge number of patents . . . used in research laboratories throughout the
U.S. every day, including human gene patents” and reported that these patents have had a “relatively minor impact on basic research.”204 Relying on
the support from this survey, proponents turned to the legislative history
regarding human gene patents.205 Since patents are not self enforcing206 and
the survey found that “basic research activities are rarely, if ever, the subject of patent infringement lawsuits,” proponents suggest that researchers
are largely choosing to either ignore the existence of a patent or “at least not
letting the existence of a patent dictate their research agenda.”207 In addition, as mentioned above, proponents contend that precedent within U.S.
patent law recognizes an “experimental use exception.”208 Therefore, proponents conclude that because no evidence exists to suggest that researchers
are behaving irrationally or being deterred from conducting research to pro197. Ellis, supra note 70, at 14 (citing Campbell et al., supra note 98, at 473).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Ellis, supra note 70, at 15 (citing Walsh et al., supra note 102, at 2003).
202. Id. (citing Walsh et al., supra note 102, at 2002).
203. Id. (citing Walsh et al., supra note 102, at 2003). The survey also reported that of those
surveyed, none declared that third-party patents stopped their research and only 1% stated that
research was delayed as a result of another party’s patent.
204. Holman, supra note 70, at 305 (citing Walsh et al., supra note 102, at 2002–03).
205. Holman, supra note 70, at 306.
206. This means that “the mere issuance of a patent does not legally restrict the ability of
anybody to do anything unless and until the patent owner successfully sues for patent infringement.” Holman, supra note 70, at 305.
207. Id.
208. Ellis, supra note 70, at 15–16; see also Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
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mote healthcare, patents on human genetic material do not violate public
policy.209
Critics are also concerned that if patents continue to be issued for genetic information, it would obstruct advancement in the area of diagnostic
testing.210 Specifically, critics worry that patent holders will only allow for
their laboratory to test for the patented gene,211 and that companies engaged
in this sort of conduct will make the performance of diagnostic testing difficult because only they can test for “their” gene.212 Critics have relied on
one survey which reported that due to a recently issued patent for a test to
screen for hereditary haemochromatosis213 (HFE test), “twenty five percent
of the laboratories had been deterred from offering a test due to the enforcement of a patent or [lack of a] license.”214 Behind this survey was Smith
Kline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, who after purchasing an exclusive
license for the patented HFE test, wrote letters to laboratories instructing
them to stop performing or developing tests for the patented gene.215 In the
alternative, they requested “an upfront fee of $25,000 from academic laboratories, and [five] to [ten] times more than this from commercial laboratories, plus royalties of as much as $20 fee per test.”216
As another example, critics of human gene patents often cite to Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institution, Inc., a case dealing
with a patent for diagnosing Canavan disease.217 Canavan disease “leads to
a degeneration of the brain, causing the children to lose their vision, experience seizures, and eventually require tube feeding.”218 Children suffering
from this disease rarely make it into their teenage years.219 Over time, with
the cooperation between families with children suffering from Canavan disease and a team of researchers, the particular gene causing the disease was
isolated, allowing for genetic labs across the country to provide prenatal
209. Holman, supra note 70, at 305 and n.60.
210. Andrews, Gene Patents, supra note 89, at 407.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Merz et al., supra note 167, at 578. This survey was performed in November 1998
through September 1999 and consisted of laboratory directors and supervisors. The purpose was
to determine the impact of the HFE patent and the SBCL licensing strategy. “Hereditary
Haemochromatosis is a common autosomal recessive disease, affecting 1 in 200 to 1 in 300 people of northern European descent . . . [a]s much as 80–85% of haemochromatosis is caused by the
two most common mutant alleles of the HFE gene (C282Y and H63D).” Id. at 577.
214. Andrews, Gene Patents, supra note 89, at 408.
215. Merz et al., supra note 167, at 578.
216. Id.; Andrews, Gene Patents, supra note 89, at 408.
217. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institution, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064
(S.D. Fla. 2003); see also Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 8, at 91 (explaining
that “Canavan disease is a rare genetic disease that occurs most frequently in Ashkenazi Jewish
families.”).
218. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 8, at 91.
219. Id.
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and carrier screening.220 In an attempt to circumvent this tragic disease,
Rabbi Josef Ekstein established a genetic testing program in New York to
screen and test for Canavan disease.221 The program made significant progress until the gene was patented and the patent owner sent cease and desist
letters and demanded royalties for tests performed.222 The ultimate result
was that fewer tests could be performed and, as emphasized by Ekstein,
“there’s no question that [more] Canavan children [would] be born.”223
After comparing patents associated with pharmaceuticals and patents
on human genetic information, it is further contended that a patent on genetic information wrongly grants monopolistic protection and, even if the
protection is the only means available, it inappropriately compensates gene
patent holders.224 Commentators argue that the significant difference between patents on pharmaceuticals and gene patents is that, unlike
pharmaceuticals and other technology where “other researchers still have
the option to invent ‘around’ the patent,” securing a patent on genetic information leaves no alternatives.225 Patents on genetic information are unique
in that after a gene has been associated with a disorder, “only that gene can
be used in genetic testing to compare with genetic information from potentially diseased individuals.”226 Similarly, these commentators argue that research to acquire a patent on human genetic information that leads to
genetic testing does not require the same financial compensation that is
commonly associated with pharmaceuticals and patents on new drugs.227
For pharmaceutical drug development, the costs associated with bringing a
product to market are inflated due to “salaries for research and development
scientists, the great expense of animal research and human clinical trials,
and the cost of obtaining FDA approval.”228 Alternatively, due to technological developments in the area of genomic screening, critics state that
there have been cases where a “disease gene has been identified one day
and testing begun almost immediately.”229 Moreover, critics have pointed
out that “[b]ecause the FDA does not regulate the clinical services of genetic tests . . . there is no costly FDA approval process.”230 Since the financial incentives that the patent system is supposed to foster are inappropriate
and because granting patents would limit access to genetic screening that
ultimately would reduce the risk of life threatening diseases, these commen220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Westhoff, supra note 14, at 9.
Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 8, at 92.
Id.
Id.
See Andrews, Gene Patents, supra note 89, at 406–07.
Westhoff, supra note 14, at 8.
Id.
Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 8, at 77.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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tators adamantly argue that it is immoral for the U.S. patent law to grant
protection for this type of “discovery.”231
Commentators who support patenting human genetic information acknowledge that increased costs to genetic diagnostic testing could increase
the likelihood for inheriting a genetic disorder.232 These commentators argue that “there is almost no empirical data to suggest that genetic tests, or
the clinical knowledge resulting from them, are negatively affected by gene
patents.”233 Ethical considerations are typically not addressed by these commentators regardless of the multiple case studies which evidence the fact
that individuals have been denied access and as a result have inherited the
genetic disease.
2. Special Status of Human Genetic Information
Delving deeper into the ethical realm of this controversy, commentators opposing patents for human genetic information argue that the special
status of human DNA and the human genome is “unique and distinctive,”
and therefore “it should be treated differently from other such genomes,
such as mice or maize.”234 This argument centers on the “common heritage” principle and contends that human genetic information should be a
shared resource that cannot be monopolized for the benefit of one state or
group of states but should be treated as to be used to the benefit of all.235 In
fact, one of the original goals of the Human Genome Project was to build a
publicly owned database of the entire human genome. As a result of the
“race to the patent office” and the massive privatization of this information,
Dr. James Watson, who began the Human Genome Project, responded by
resigning from his position and stated that he had “always striven to see that
the fruits of the American Dream are available to all.”236 Because it is inherently difficult to elucidate what exactly the “special nature” of human
DNA is, many commentators instead argue that there exists an inalienable
nature of human genetic information and that genetic information should
remain publicly owned.237
Exploring the “inalienable nature” of human genetic information, commentators highlight that when dealing with an individual’s property rights,
231. See generally Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 8; Westhoff, supra note
14.
232. Ellis, supra note 70, at 37.
233. Id.
234. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 3, at 21.
235. Common Heritage of Mankind, supra note 160.
236. Daniel Cressey, “I Have Been Much Blessed” – Watson Retires, Oct. 25, 2007, http://
blogs.nature.com/news/thegreatbeyond/2007/10/i_have_been_much_blessed_watso.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2009).
237. NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 3, at 22.
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it is of utmost importance to respect autonomous decision-making.238 They
argue that the “inalienable right to self-ownership brings with it an inalienable right to ownership of one’s body, including one’s genes,”239 therefore
concluding that no one should be permitted to own, or receive temporary
property rights to, another human’s genetic material.240
Continuing the “common heritage” argument, commentators propose
that if human genetic information is going to continue to be protected by
property rights, it would only be proper to have them “publicly rather than
privately owned.”241 Similar to “navigable waterways, shorelines and public parks,” commentators argue that “the public interest is protected through
vesting rights of ownership in the state or some international body, or by
declar[ing] that they are not amenable to ownership.”242
These arguments have been countered by commentators who state that
comparing ownership of a patent on human genetic information to ownership over an individual or a specific aspect of an individual is incorrect.243
Instead, as previously mentioned, these commentators argue that gene patents are not mere discoveries but “isolated and purified” and therefore, cannot be associated with any individual human being.244 Further, it is argued
that the critics who express concern over ownership of the person, are misled as to what patent rights confer to its owner versus ordinary property
rights.245 Unlike typical property rights, patent rights do not grant a positive
“right to use.”246 A patent holder is “limited to the right to exclude others
from various activities involving the claimed invention, such as making,
using or selling the invention in the U.S.”247 Thus, these commentators reject the “special nature” argument because suggesting that human genetic
information has an inalienable characteristic fails to recognize that the subject of the patent is “isolated and purified” and the rights that are conferred
to the owner only include the right to exclude.248

238. Id. (relating the patenting of human genetic information to the fact that “people may not
be owned by others as slaves”).
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 21–22.
242. Id. at 23.
243. Chavez, supra note 107, at 266.
244. Id. at 258.
245. Holman, supra note 70, at 301–02.
246. Id. at 302.
247. Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006)).
248. See generally Holman, supra note 70.
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PART IV
Proposed Alternatives: Accommodating the “Unforeseeable Nature of
Inventions”
Despite the fact that the USPTO continues to grant patents for human
genetic information, there still exists strong public policy and ethical concerns that must be weighed in determining whether these patents are appropriate. Those opposing human gene patents argue that simply because broad
language exists throughout U.S. patent law holding that this information is
patentable, it does not necessitate Congressional inaction. Although these
opponents would prefer Congress to amend the Patent Act to declare human
genetic information unpatentable, they accept that such an expansive approach is unlikely considering the financial influences that biotechnology
has in Washington D.C. Surprisingly, even a few commentators who support human gene patents have recognized that there are occasionally cases,
despite what empirical data may suggest, where gene patents negatively
affect public safety and human health.249 While legislation to amend the
Patent Act was recently rejected,250 Congress should still be given access to
multiple proposed and available solutions. Of the many solutions that have
been proposed, the two most accommodating alternatives to the current
U.S. patent law framework in regard to patenting human genetic information are listed in this section.
1. Introduce “Morality” as a Subject Matter Requirement
One proposed solution is to introduce a statutory subject matter requirement that no patent may be issued if it would be contrary to public
order or morality.251 Similar provisions have been set out in international
patent law such as the European Patent Convention Article 53(a), which
prohibits patents on “inventions, the exploitations of which, would be contrary to ‘ordre public’ or ‘morality.’”252 The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) addresses this issue using similar language in Article
27.253 The European Directive on the legal protection of biotechnological
inventions “prohibits patents on processes for cloning humans, the modification of the human germ line, and the use of embryos for industrial or
commercial purposes.”254
While the USPTO has yet to adopt procedures for “ethical review,”
scholars have recommended two “informed consent” requirements that
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Ellis, supra note 70, at 21.
See Genomic Research and Accessibility Act, supra note 157.
Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 8, at 99.
Id. (citing European Patent Convention art. 53(a), 13 I.L.M. 268, 286 (1974)).
NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 3, at 34, 79.
Id. at 34 (citing 1998 O. J. (L 213) 13).
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would contribute to determining whether the patent meets “moral” standards. Both of these standards could be used as potential springboards for
generating an ethical review process. The first proposed requirement, by
Nuno Pires de Carvalho, states that the “applicants for patents in the field of
biotechnology disclose the source of the genetic resources eventually used
as raw materials or tools in the inventive activity.”255 Further, Carvalho
would require that the applicant include “evidence, if any, of informed consent from the research subjects.”256 The second proposed requirement is
similar and it specifically states that “the grant of patents . . . that relate to
elements of [genetic] heritage shall be subject to their having been acquired
legally.”257
While using the above “informed consent” proposals for generating
procedures to analyze whether a particular patent on genetic information
meets the “morality” standards serves as a starting block, the public policy
and ethical concerns enumerated in Part II of this paper must also be considered. Specifically, consideration must be given to both the potential deleterious effects on health care and the special nature of human genetic
information.
2. Patent Pools
In an attempt to overcome the concern that human gene patents limit
access to researchers and other third parties, many commentators recommend that Congress require the use of “patent pools” for human gene patents.258 While not yet mandated, this approach has been well received
because the resources required “to develop any significant fraction of genetic information present in an organism” can result in a large expenditure
of resources that no single company can afford.259 Further, if this information is not shared freely or licensed in an affordable manner, researchers
255. Marina L. Whelan, What, if Any, Are the Ethical Obligations of the U.S. Patent Office?:
A Closer Look at the Biological Sampling of Indigenous Groups, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 14,
23 (citing Nuno Pires de Carvalho, Requiring Disclosure of the Origin of Genetic Resources and
Prior Informed Consent in Patent Applications Without Infringing the TRIPS Agreement: The
Problem and the Solution, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 371 (2000)).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 25 (citing Carvalho, supra note 255, at 377) (enumerating that “[e]very document
shall specify the registration number of the contract affording access to genetic resources and a
copy thereof where the goods or services for which protection is sought have been manufactured
or developed from genetic resources, or products thereof, of which one of the member countries is
the country of origin”).
258. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 10; Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 8, at
101; Jeanne Clark et al., Patent Pools: A Solution to the Problem of Access in Biotechnology
Patents?, Dec. 5, 2000, available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patentpool.
pdf (stating that “[a] ‘patent pool’ is an agreement between two or more patent owners to license
one or more of their patents to one another or third parties”).
259. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma, supra note 8, at 101 (citing Clark, supra note 258,
at 3).
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would be precluded from developing new diagnostic testing.260 In the case
of patents on human genetic information, a congressionally mandated patent pool would essentially allow for researchers “to contribute their patented genes to the pool and agree on reasonable licensing and royalty
fees.”261 For non-member researchers wanting to make use of a patent already associated with an established pool, it has been suggested that “independent organizations” could be founded to “negotiate licensing” and
reduce concern over defining reasonability standards.262
Patent pools relieve concern that an individual patent holder could refuse to allow use of their patent as a means to extract exorbitant licensing
fees.263 By removing transaction costs associated with acquiring multiple
licenses, it is likely that gene function could be identified more easily and
diagnostic tests could be more efficiently developed, and thus result in
lower costs for consumers.264 Additionally, it removes the trepidation that
genetic diagnostic testing would only be available at a few laboratories
which were authorized by the original patent holder and, as a result, have
overly inflated rates.265 Finally, pooling offers members financial security
by allocating the risk of research and development to all those affiliated
with the pool.266 While pools can be structured according to members’ preferences, it is typical that “each member of the pool receives a certain percentage of the total royalties collected by the group.”267 Thus, to many
commentators, the increased access to make use of another researcher’s labor and the increased likelihood of recovering research and development
costs makes this solution attractive.268
CONCLUSION
Patents on human genetic information continue to be granted by the
USPTO despite multiple challenges as to whether they satisfy constitutional
and patentable subject matter requirements or whether they coincide with
our nation’s public policy, healthcare directives, and individual ethical concerns. It remains clear that advancements within biotechnology and the expansion of the “unforeseeable nature” of inventions will continue due to the
incredible power of the human mind. Although patent protection remains
the most effective way to incentivize research and disseminate that learned
260. Id. (suggesting a solution “similar to the pool created by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers . . . [where] instead of negotiating with each holder of a copyright
for thousands of songs, a radio station or bar can buy a blanket license”).
261. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 10.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 10–11.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 11.
266. Westhoff, supra note 14, at 11.
267. Id.
268. Id.

\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-2\UST213.txt

516

unknown

Seq: 31

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL

7-AUG-09

16:17

[Vol. 6:2

knowledge to the public, options exist for Congress to reform the United
States Patent Act so that it will continue to “promote the progress of science,” allow for the recovery of research and development costs, and ensure
affordable access to health care. Absent a clear directive by Congress, the
U.S. Courts and the USPTO will remain bound by precedent which is unable to direct the issuance of patents that will undoubtedly contest the availability of healthcare and the ethical consideration regarding the special
nature of human genetic information. As scientists continue to advance understanding of human nature, it is the role of our legislature to set standards
so as to protect public health and the common good.

